I share Withington's concern over much of the hyperbole that surrounds today's talk about artificial intelligence (Al). Many of those who try to sell us such supposedly intelligent merchandise as the expert systems or ordinary language interfaces seem (to me and Withington) to promise a lot more intelligence than they can actually deliver today. I am reminded of the story about the boy who cried "wolf." He was, if you will recall, wrong the first few times but right in the long run. The same scenario may happen with the Al people's cry of "smart" systems. Notice that I said "may" and not "will."
We often seem to be too optimistic when we predict what a new technology will do in the short run, but not optimistic enough in the long run. When the computer was first invented, for example, it was widely touted as a giant brain and there were predictions that it would be playing world championship chess by 1960. That short term prediction was, as we now know, a bit premature. Computers do not play chess at a world championship level yet. Some of the long term (and far fetched for the time) predictions turned out to be surprisingly conservative. Even though computers (based on vacuum tubes) were large, unreliable and expensive, a few optimists predicted as many as a thousand would exist by the year 2000. That turned out to be a "bit" on the low side.
Withington is, I agree, right in the short run. There are no really smart systems around today. In my personal opinion, the concepts used in systems being touted as smart today -the concepts that underlie the expert systems, the ordinary language interfaces and others -are too primitive to ever lead to smart systems. He is right in warning those of us who have to use them to beware of the accompanying promises. It is wise to assume that a system is not smart until you have tried it out yourself. Don't be misled by promises or canned demonstrations. Withington seems to feel that computers cannot be "smart" because they can only do what they are told to do. They do not, he argues, understand why. They lack consciousness, volition or purpose. Withington may be right; but he may be wrong for two reasons. He claims that humans actually have these special features; however, as we have learned, we can be mistaken about how our own minds work. We may think we have purposes and self-consciousness, but perhaps what seems to us to be self-consciousness or purpose, is really something else. If it was, it would not be the first time that introspection had been wrong. We trust introspection because our mind tells us we are right. But our accounts of how the mind works have often been wrong as they might be here.
Withington may also be wrong in his claim that computers cannot have these features. Many of the approaches to Al listed above are based on theories of how computers might be given purpose, consciousness, and the like. And those theories might give us ways to develop these "human" features into machines.
